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Abstract
Controlled query evaluation (CQE) is an approach to guarantee
data privacy for database and knowledge base systems. CQE-systems
feature a censor function that may distort the answer to a query in
order to hide sensitive information. We introduce a high-level for-
malization of controlled query evaluation and define several desirable
properties of CQE-systems. Finally we establish two no-go theorems,
which show that certain combinations of these properties cannot be
obtained.
1 Introduction
Controlled query evaluation (CQE) refers to a data privacy mechanism where
the database (or knowledge base) is equipped with a censor function. This
censor checks for each query whether the answer to the query would reveal
sensitive information to a user. If this is the case, then the censor will distort
the answer. Essentially, there are two possibilities how an answer may be
distorted:
1. the CQE-system may refuse to answer the query [18] or
2. the CQE-system may give an incorrect answer, i.e. it lies [10].
∗supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant 200020 184625.
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This censor based approach has the advantage that the task of maintain-
ing privacy is separated from the task of keeping the data. This gives more
flexibility than an integrated approach (like hiding rows in a database) and
guarantees than no information is leaked through otherwise unidentified in-
ference channels. Controlled query evaluation has been applied to a variety
of data models and control mechansims, see, e.g. [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 21].
No-go theorems are well-known in theoretical physics where they describe
particular situations that are not physically possible. Often the term is used
for results in quantum mechanics like Bell’s theorem [4], the Kochen–Specker
theorem [15], or, for a more recent example, the Frauchiger–Renner para-
dox [12]. Nurgalieva and del Rio [16] provide a modal logic analysis of the
latter paradox. Arrow’s theorem [2] in social choice theory also is a no-go the-
orem stating that no voting system can be designed that meets certain given
fairness conditions. Pacuit and Yang [17] present a version of independence
logic in which Arrow’s theorem is derivable.
In the present paper we develop a highly abstract model for dynamic
query evaluation systems like CQE. We formulate several desirable prop-
erties of CQE-systems in our framework and establish two no-go theorems
saying that certain combinations of those properties are impossible. The
main contribution of this paper is the presentation of the abstract logical
framework as well as the high-level formulation of the no-go theorems. Note
that some particular instances of our results have already been known [5, 21].
There are many different notions of privacy available in the literature.
For our results, we rely on provable privacy [19, 20], which is a rather weak
notion of data privacy. Note that using a weak definition of privacy makes our
impossibility theorems actually stronger since they state that under certain
conditions not even this weak form of privacy can be achieved.
Clearly our work is also connected to the issues of lying and deception.
Logics dealing with these notions are introduced and studied, e.g., in [1, 22,
13].
2 Logical Preliminaries
Let X be a set. We use P(X) to denote the power set of X . For sets Γ
and ∆ we use Γ,∆ for Γ ∪ ∆. Moreover, in such a context we write A for
the singleton set {A}. Hence Γ, A stands for Γ ∪ {A}.
Definition 1. A logic L is given by
1. a set of formulas FmlL and
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2. a consequence relation ⊢L for L that is a relation between sets of formu-
las and formulas, i.e. ⊢L ⊆ P(FmlL) × FmlL satisfying for all A,C ∈
FmlL and Γ,∆ ∈ P(FmlL):
(a) reflexivity: {A} ⊢L A;
(b) weakening: Γ ⊢L A =⇒ Γ,∆ ⊢L A;
(c) transitivity: Γ ⊢L C and ∆, C ⊢L A =⇒ Γ,∆ ⊢L A.
Transitivity is sometimes called cut. The previous definition gives us
single conclusion consequence relations, which is sufficient for the purpose of
this paper. For other notions of consequence relations see, e.g., [3] and [14].
As usual, we write ⊢L A for ∅ ⊢L A. A formula A is called a theorem of
L if ⊢L A.
We do not specify the logic L any further. The only thing we need is a
consequence relation as given above. For instance, L may be classical propo-
sitional logic with ⊢L being the usual derivation relation (see Section 4) or
L may be a description logic with ⊢L being its semantic consequence rela-
tion [21].
Definition 2.
1. A logic L is called consistent if there exists a formula A ∈ FmlL such
that 6 ⊢LA.
2. A set Γ of FmlL-formulas is called L-consistent if there exists a formula
A ∈ FmlL such that Γ 6 ⊢LA.
We need a simple modal logic M over L.
Definition 3. The set of formulas FmlM is given inductively by:
1. if A is a formula of FmlL, then ✷A is a formula of FmlM;
2. ⊥ is a formula of FmlM;
3. if A and B are formulas of FmlM, so is A→ B, too.
We define the remaining classical connectives ⊤, ∧, ∨, and ¬ as usual.
Note that M is not a fully-fledged modal logic. For instance, it does not
include nested modalities.
We give semantics to FmlM-formulas as follows.
Definition 4. An M-model M is a set of sets of FmlL-formulas, that is
M⊆ P(FmlL).
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Definition 5. Let M be an M-model. Truth of an FmlM-formula in M is
inductively defined by:
1. M  ✷A iff w ⊢L A for all w ∈M;
2. M 6 ⊥;
3. M  A→ B iff M 6 A or M  B.
We use the following standard definition.
Definition 6. Let Γ be a set of FmlM-formulas.
1. We write M  Γ iff M  A for each A ∈ Γ.
2. Γ is called satisfiable iff there exists an M-model M with M  Γ.
3. Γ entails a formula A, in symbols Γ |= A, iff for each model M we
have that
M  Γ implies M  A.
3 Privacy
Definition 7. A privacy configuration is a triple (KB,AK, Sec) that consists
of:
1. the knowledge base KB ⊆ FmlL, which is only accessible via the censor;
2. the set of a priori knowledge AK ⊆ FmlM, which formalizes general
background knowledge known to the attacker and the censor;
3. the set of secrets Sec ⊆ FmlL, which should be protected by the censor.
A privacy configuration (KB,AK, Sec) satisfies the following conditions:
1. KB is L-consistent (consistency);
2. {KB}  AK (truthful start);
3. AK 6|= ✷s for each s ∈ Sec (hidden secrets).
Note that in the above definition, KB and Sec are sets of FmlL-formulas
while AK is a set of FmlM-formulas. Thus AK may not only contain domain
knowledge but also knowledge about the structure of KB. This is further
explained in Section 4.
A query to a knowledge base KB is simply a formula of FmlL.
Given a logic L, we can evaluate a query q over a knowledge base KB.
There are two possible answers: t (true) and u (unknown).
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Definition 8. The evaluation function eval is defined by:
eval(KB, q) :=
{
t if KB ⊢L q
u otherwise
If the language of the logic L includes negation, then one may also consider
an evaluation function that can return the value f (false), i.e. one defines
eval(KB, q) := f if KB ⊢L ¬q. However, in the general setting of this paper,
we cannot include this case.
A censor has to hide the secrets. In order to achieve this, it can not only
answer t and u to a query but also r (refuse to answer). We denote the set
of possible answers of a censor by
A := {t, u, r}.
Let X be a set. Then Xω denotes the set of infinite sequences of elements
of X .
Definition 9. A censor is a mapping that assigns an answering function
Cens(KB,AK,Sec) : Fml
ω
L
−→ Aω
to each privacy configuration (KB,AK, Sec). By abuse of notation, we also
call the answering function Cens(KB,AK,Sec) a censor. A sequence q ∈ Fml
ω
L
is
called query sequence.
Usually, the privacy configuration will be clear from the context. In that
case we simply use Cens instead of Cens(KB,AK,Sec).
Given a sequence s, we use si to denote its i-th element. That is for a
query sequence q ∈ FmlωL , we use qi to denote the i-th query and Cens(q)i to
denote the i-th answer of the censor.
Example 10. Let A,B,C ∈ FmlL. We define a privacy configuration with
KB = {A,C}, AK = ∅, and Sec = {C}. A censor Cens yields an answering
function Cens(KB,AK,Sec), which applied to a query sequence q = (A,B,C, . . .)
yields a sequence of answers, e.g.,
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q) = t, u, r, . . ..
In this case, Cens(KB,AK,Sec) gives true answers since eval(KB, A) = t and
eval(KB, B) = u and it protects the secret be refusing to answer the query C.
Another option for the answering function would be to answer the third
query with u, i.e., it would lie (instead of refuse to answer) in order to protect
the secret.
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A further option would be to always refuse the answer, i.e.
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q) = r, r, r, . . ..
This, of course, would be a trivial (and useless) answering function that
would, however, preserve all secrets.
In this paper, we will consider continuous censors only, which are given
as follows.
Definition 11. A censor Cens is continuous iff for each privacy configuration
(KB,AK, Sec) and for all query sequences q, q′ ∈ Fmlω
L
and all n ∈ ω we have
that
q|n = q
′|n =⇒ Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|n = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′)|n
where for an infinite sequence s = (s1, s2, . . .), we use s|n to denote the initial
segment of s of length n, i.e. s|n = (s1, . . . , sn).
Continuity means that the answer of a censor to a query does not depend
on future queries, see also Lemma 14.
A censor is called truthful if it does not lie.
Definition 12. A censor Cens is called truthful iff for each privacy config-
uration (KB,AK, Sec), all query sequences q = (q1, q2, . . .), and all sequences
(a1, a2, . . .) = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)
we have that for all i ∈ ω
ai = eval(KB, qi) or ai = r.
Hence a truthful censor may refuse to answer a query in order to protect
a secret but it will not give an incorrect answer.
In the modal logic M over L, we can express what knowledge one can gain
from the answers of a censor to a query. This is called the content of the
answer.
Definition 13. Given an answer a ∈ A to a query q ∈ FmlL, we define its
content as follows:
cont(q, t) := ✷q
cont(q, u) := ¬✷q
cont(q, r) := ⊤
6
Assume that we are given a privacy configuration (KB,AK, Sec) and a censor
Cens. We define the content of the answers of the censor to a query sequence
q ∈ FmlωL up to n ∈ ω by
cont(Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) :=
⋃
1≤i≤n
{cont(qi, ai)} ∪ AK
where a = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q). Note that here we have also included the a priori
knowledge.
The following is a trivial observation showing the role of continuity.
Lemma 14. Let Cens be a continuous censor. The content function is mono-
tone in the second argument: for m ≤ n we have
cont(Cens(q), m) ⊆ cont(Cens(q), n).
We call a censor credible if it does not return contradicting answers.
Definition 15. A censor Cens is called credible iff for each privacy config-
uration (KB,AK, Sec) and for every query sequence q and every n ∈ ω, the
set cont(Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) is satisfiable.
Definition 16. The full content of a knowledge base KB is given by
full(KB) :=
⋃
A∈FmlL
cont(A, eval(KB, A)).
Lemma 17. For any knowledge base KB, we have that
{KB}  full(KB).
Proof. Let A be an FmlL-formula. We dinstinguish:
1. KB ⊢L A. Then ✷A ∈ full(KB) and further {KB}  ✷A.
2. KB 6⊢L A. Then ¬✷A ∈ full(KB) and further {KB}  ¬✷A.
Lemma 18. We let (KB,AK, Sec) be a privacy configuration. Further we let
Cens(KB,AK,Sec) be a truthful censor. For every query sequence q and n ∈ ω,
we have that
cont(Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) ⊆ full(KB) ∪ {⊤} ∪ AK.
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Proof. By induction on n. The base case n = 0 is trivial since
cont(Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q), 0) = AK.
Induction step. Since Cens is truthful, we have
an+1 ∈ {r, eval(KB, qn+1)}.
We distinguish:
1. an+1 = r. Then cont(Cens(q), n + 1) = cont(Cens(q), n) ∪ {⊤} and the
claim follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
2. an+1 = eval(KB, qn+1). Then
cont(Cens(q), n+ 1) = cont(Cens(q), n) ∪
cont(qn+1, eval(KB, qn+1)).
The claim follows from the induction hypothesis and
cont(qn+1, eval(KB, qn+1)) ∈ full(KB),
which holds by Definition 16.
The following corollary is a generalization of Cor. 30 in [21].
Corollary 19. Every truthful censor is credible.
Proof. Let (KB,AK, Sec) be a privacy configuration and Cens be a truthful
censor for it. By Definition 7, we have {KB}  AK. Thus by the two previous
lemmas, we find that for each n ∈ ω,
{KB}  full(KB) ∪ {⊤} ∪ AK
and
full(KB) ∪ {⊤} ∪ AK ⊇ cont(Cens(q), n),
that means cont(Cens(q), n) is satisfiable for each n ∈ ω and thus Cens is
credible.
There are several properties that a ‘good’ censor should fulfil. We call a
censor effective if it protects all secrets.
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Definition 20. A censor Cens is called effective iff for each privacy configu-
ration (KB,AK, Sec) and for every query sequence q ∈ Fmlω
L
and every n ∈ ω,
we have
cont(Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) 6|= ✷s for each s ∈ Sec
A ‘good’ censor should only distort an answer to a query when it is
absolutely necessary, i.e. when giving the correct answer would leak a secret.
We call such a censor minimally invasive.
Definition 21. Let Cens be an effective and credible censor. This censor is
called minimally invasive iff for each privacy configuration (KB,AK, Sec) and
for each query sequence q ∈ Fmlω
L
, we have that whenever
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)i 6= eval(KB, qi),
replacing
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)i with eval(KB, qi)
would lead to a violation of effectiveness or credibility, that is for any censor
Cens
′
(KB,AK,Sec) such that
Cens
′
(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|i−1 = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|i−1
and
Cens
′
(KB,AK,Sec)(q)i = eval(KB, qi)
we have that for some n
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) |= ✷s for some s ∈ Sec
or
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) is not satisfiable.
It is a trivial observation that a truthful, effective and minimally invasive
censor has to answer the same query always in the same way.
Lemma 22. Let Cens be a truthful, effective and minimally invasive censor.
Further let (KB,AK, Sec) be a privacy configuration and q be a query sequence
with qi = qj for some i, j. Then
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)i = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)j.
Consider a truthful, effective, continuous and minimally invasive censor
and a given query sequence. If the censor lies to answer some query, then
giving the correct answer would immediately reveal a secret.
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Lemma 23. Let Cens be a truthful, effective, continuous and minimally in-
vasive censor. Further let (KB,AK, Sec) be a privacy configuration and q be
a query sequence. Let i be the least natural number such that
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)i 6= eval(KB, qi).
Let Cens′(KB,AK,Sec) be such that
Cens
′
(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|i−1 = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|i−1
and
Cens
′
(KB,AK,Sec)(q)i = eval(KB, qi).
Then it holds that
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q), i) |= ✷s for some s ∈ Sec.
Proof. Consider the query sequence q′ given by q′j := qj for j < i and q
′
j := qi
for j ≥ i, i.e. q′ has the form (q1, q2, . . . , qi−1, qi, qi, qi, . . .). In particular, we
have q|i = q
′|i. Thus by continuity of the censor we find
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|i = Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′)|i.
Thus Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′)i 6= eval(KB, qi). By the definition of minimally
invasive we find that for some n
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′), n) |= ✷s for some s ∈ Sec (1)
or
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′), n) is not satisfiable. (2)
Since the censor is truthful and by Corollary 19, we find that (2) is not
possible. Thus (1) holds for some n.
By the definition of q′ and the previous lemma we find
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′), n) = cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q
′), i)
if i ≤ n. Thus, in case i ≤ n, (1) implies
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q), i) |= ✷s for some s ∈ Sec. (3)
In case i > n, we find by Lemma 14 that
cont(Cens′(KB,AK,Sec)(q), n) ⊆ cont(Cens
′
(KB,AK,Sec)(q), i).
Thus again (1) implies (3), which finishes the proof.
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Next we define the notion of a repudiating censor, which garantees that
there is always a knowledge base in which no secret holds and which, given
as input to the answering function, produces the same results as the ac-
tual knowledge base. Hence this definition provides a version of plausible
deniability for all secrets.
Definition 24. A censor Cens is called repudiating iff for each privacy con-
figuration (KB,AK, Sec) and each query sequence q, there are knowledge bases
KBi (i ∈ ω) such that
1. (KBi,AK, Sec) is a privacy configuration for each i ∈ ω;
2. Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|n = Cens(KBn,AK,Sec)|n, for each n ∈ ω;
3. KBi 6⊢L s for each s ∈ Sec and each i ∈ ω.
Now we can establish our first no-go theorem, which is a generalization
of Th. 50 in [21].
Theorem 25 (First No-Go Theorem). A continuous and truthful censor
satisfies at most two of the properties effectiveness, minimal invasion, and
repudiation.
Proof. Let the censor Cens be continuous, truthful, effective, and minimally
invasive. We show that Cens cannot be repudiating. We let S be an FmlL-
formula and consider the privacy configuration (KB,AK, Sec) given by
KB := {S} AK := ∅ Sec := {S}
and the query sequence q := (S, S, . . .). We set
a := Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q).
Obviously, we have a = (r, r, . . .) since otherwise Cens would either be lying
(i.e. not be truthful) or revealing a secret (i.e. not be effective).
Now asssume that Cens is repudiating. Then there exists a knowledge
base KB1 such that
1. (KB1,AK, Sec) is a privacy configuration;
2. Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|1 = Cens(KB1,AK,Sec)(q)|1;
3. KB1 6⊢L S.
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Let (a′1) := Cens(KB1,AK,Sec)(q)|1. Because of KB1 6⊢L S and Cens being truth-
ful, we find that a′1 = u or a
′
1 = r.
Suppose towards a contradiction that
a′1 = r. (4)
Now let Cens′ be a censor as in Lemma 23, i.e. such that
Cens
′
(KB1,AK,Sec)(q)1 = u = eval(KB1, S). (5)
By Lemma 23 we get
cont(Cens′(KB1,AK,Sec)(q), 1) |= ✷S. (6)
However, by (5) we also have cont(Cens′(KB1,AK,Sec)(q), 1) = {¬✷S}, which
contradicts (6).
Hence (4) is not possible and thus we have a′1 = u. This, however,
contradicts Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q)|1 = Cens(KB1,AK,Sec)(q)|1. We conclude that Cens
cannot be repudiating.
4 Non-refusing censors
In this section we study censors that do not refuse to answer a query.
Definition 26. A censor is non-refusing if it never assigns the answer r to
a query.
Of course, a non-refusing censor has to lie in order to keep the secrets.
That means if a censors of this kind shall be effective, then it cannot be
truthful.
Even if we consider lying censors, we work with the assumption that
an attacker believes every answer of the censor. (7)
Otherwise, we are in a situation where an attacker cannot believe any answer
because the attacker does not know which answers are correct and which are
wrong, which means that any answer could be a lie. In that case, querying
a knowledge base would not make any sense at all.1
Because of the assumption (7), we can use our notions of effectiveness
(Definition 20) and credibility (Definition 15) also in the context of lying
1This is, of course, not completely true. It is possible to distort knowledge bases in
such a way that privacy is preserved but statistical inferences are still informative, see,
e.g. [11].
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censors: an attacker should not believe any secret and the beliefs should be
satisfiable.
Theorem 25 about truthful censors did not make any assumptions on
the underlying logic L. The next theorem about non-refusing censors is less
general as it is based on classical logic. We will use a, b, c, . . . for atomic
propositions and A,B,C, . . . for arbitrary formulas.
Moreover, we assume that the knowledge base KB only contains atomic
facts (we say KB is atomic). That is if F ∈ KB, then F is either of the form
p or of the form ¬p where p is an atomic proposition. Hence we find that if
KB ⊢L a→ b for two distinct atomic propositions a and b, then KB ⊢L ¬a or
KB ⊢L b. We can formalize this using the set of a priori knowledge by letting
✷(a→ b)→ (✷¬a ∨ ✷b) ∈ AK.
Now we can establish our second no-go theorem, which is a generalization
of the results of [5].
Theorem 27 (Second No-Go Theorem). Let L be based on classical logic. A
continuous and non-refusing censor cannot be at the same time effective and
minimally invasive.
Proof. Let the censor Cens be continuous, non-refusing, and minimally inva-
sive. We show that Cens cannot be effective. Let L be classical propositional
logic. We consider the knowledge base
KB := {a, b}
where both a and b shall be kept secret, i.e.
Sec := {a, b}.
Further we assume that it is a priori knowledge that KB is atomic. Thus, in
particular,
✷(c→ a)→ (✷¬c ∨✷a) ∈ AK
✷(¬c→ b)→ (✷c ∨ ✷b) ∈ AK
We consider the query sequence q := (c → a,¬c → b, c, . . .) and set a :=
Cens(KB,AK,Sec)(q).
We find Cens(c → a) = t since Cens is minimally invasive and KB might
contain ¬c. Further, we find Cens(¬c → b) = t since Cens is minimally
invasive and KB might contain c.
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Note that after issuing the first two queries of the sequence q, an attacker
knows that a or b must be entailed by KB. But since the attacker does not
know which one is the case, no secret is leaked. Formally we have
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷(c→ a) (8)
and
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷(¬c→ b). (9)
By basic modal logic, (8) and (9) yield
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷c→ ✷a (10)
and
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷¬c→ ✷b, (11)
respectively. Using the a priori knowledge AK, we obtain from (8) and (9)
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷¬c ∨ ✷a (12)
and
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷c ∨ ✷b. (13)
Because of ✷c ∨ ¬✷c, we get by (10) and (13) that
cont(Cens(q), 2) ⊢M ✷a ∨ ✷b.
Thus, at this stage, it is known that a secret holds, but an attacker does not
know which one and hence privacy is still preserved.
Now comes the third query, which is c. There are two possibilities for a
non-refusing censor to choose from:
1. (a)3 = u (which is true). We find cont(Cens(q), 3) ⊢M ¬✷c. By (13) we
get cont(Cens(q), 3) ⊢M ✷b and a secret is leaked.
2. (a)3 = t (which is a lie). We find cont(Cens(q), 3) ⊢M ✷c. By (10) we
get cont(Cens(q), 3) ⊢M ✷a and a secret is leaked.
In both cases, a secret is leaked. Thus the censor cannot be effective.
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To avoid this problem, a censor must not only protect the single elements
of Sec but also their disjunction [5]. For the privacy configuration of the
previous proof that means Cens must also protect a ∨ b. Then, already the
second query, ¬c → b would be answered with u because the answer t, as
shown above, reveals a ∨ b.
Note that protecting the disjunction of all secrets is not as simple as it
sounds. Consider, for instance, a hospital information system that should
protect the disease a patient is diagnosed with. In this case, protecting the
disjunction of all secrets means protecting the information that the patient
has some disease. This, however, is not feasible as it is general background
knowledge that everybody who is a patient in a hospital has some disease.
Worse than that, sometimes the disjunction of all secrets may even be a
logical tautology, which cannot be protected.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have established two no-go theorems for data privacy us-
ing tools from modal logic. We are confident that logical methods will play
an important role for finding new impossibility theorems or for better under-
standing already known ones, see, e.g., the logical analyses carried out in [16]
and [17].
Another line of future research relates to the fact that refusing to answer
a query can give away the information that there exists a secret that could
be infered from some other answer. Similar phenomena may occur in multi-
agent systems when one of the agents refuses to communicate. For example,
imagine the situation of an oral exam where the examiner asks a question and
the student keeps silent. In this case the examiner learns that the student
does not know the answer to the question for otherwise the student would
have answered.
It is also possible that refusing an answer can lead to knowing that some-
one else knows a certain fact. Consider the following scenario. A father
enters a room where his daughter is playing and he notices that one of the
toys is in pieces. So he asks who has broken the toy. The daughter does
not want to betray her brother (who actually broke it) and she also does
not want to lie. Therefore, she refuses to answer her father’s question. Of
course, then the father knows that his daughter knows who broke the toy for
otherwise the daughter could have said that she does not know.
We believe that it is worthwhile to study the above situations using gen-
eral communication protocols that include the possibility of refusing an an-
swer and to investigate the implications of refusing in terms of higher-order
15
knowledge.
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